The recent kidnapping of schoolchildren and their teachers in Oyo State, coupled with the reported beheading of one of the victims, has once again thrust Nigeria’s security challenges into the national spotlight. But for former Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai (Rtd), the tragedy is not an isolated incident. Rather, it is the latest chapter in a security crisis that has gradually expanded across the country over two decades.
Speaking during an appearance on TVC’s Beyond the Headlines, Buratai painted a picture of an insurgency and criminal network that has evolved geographically, politically, and operationally since its emergence in the North-East.
“What happened in Oyo State is highly unfortunate,” he said. “The kidnapping of the school children and their staff is highly unfortunate. The beheading of one of the teachers is highly unfortunate.”
Yet beyond expressing sympathy, the former army chief sought to place the incident within a broader context, warning that the pattern now unfolding in the South-West mirrors developments that began years ago in other parts of the country.
The Long Journey of Insecurity
According to Buratai, while Boko Haram officially emerged in 2009, the roots of the insurgency can be traced back to the mid-2000s. What began in the North-East gradually spread to the North-West and North-Central before reaching parts of southern Nigeria.
“It started in the Northeast, then spread to the Northwest and then to the North Central, and now in the South West,” he observed.
For security analysts, the observation reflects growing concerns about the geographic expansion of violent criminal networks and the increasing sophistication of their operations.
Buratai argued that understanding this evolution is essential to addressing the current wave of kidnappings, banditry, and terrorism.
“You can see the pattern in terms of this insurgency or insecurity in general. That pattern is well understood,” he said.
Politics, Poverty and Security
While insecurity is often linked to poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion, Buratai suggested that political factors also play a significant role.
He pointed to what he described as a recurring trend in which criminal groups become more active during election seasons and periods of political transition.
“So you can see that the school abductions happen mainly when there are political activities or when there are transitions from one administration to another,” he said.
Drawing from Nigeria’s recent political history, Buratai referenced the transition that brought late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua to power in 2007 and the subsequent efforts by successive administrations to tackle the growing insurgency.
Despite military operations and policy interventions under different governments, he noted that terrorist groups have remained determined and adaptive.
Not a Failure of Government Alone
One of Buratai’s most striking arguments was his rejection of the notion that insecurity should be viewed solely as a failure of government institutions.
While acknowledging that inadequate resources and poor coordination can hamper security efforts, he stressed that terrorist and criminal groups thrive because they are embedded within communities.
“It’s relative for us to say either a government or an institution has failed,” he explained.
“You can blame the government sometimes for probably lack of coordination and failure to providing resources, but by and large, what I know is that these terrorists live within our society, they live in our backyards, communities and villages.”
According to him, insurgents maintain networks in both urban and rural areas, making intelligence gathering and community cooperation critical components of any successful counter-terrorism strategy.
This, he argued, was one of the reasons the Civilian Joint Task Force proved effective during the height of the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East.
“When it started in 2009, several efforts were made to degrade them and that was how with the collaboration of the civilian JTF, they were driven into the bush and many of them were eliminated,” he recalled.
Why Security Forces Move Carefully
As public outrage grows over kidnappings and delayed rescue operations, Buratai urged Nigerians to appreciate the complexities involved in rescuing hostages.
Contrary to perceptions that security agencies are unaware of the whereabouts of victims, he suggested that intelligence may already exist but that operational decisions are often influenced by concerns over civilian casualties.
“The security agencies must be aware of where the Oyo kidnapped victims are,” he said.
“But I believe also that the collateral damage is a major factor that should be put into consideration and it requires a lot of strategies and planning to be able to carry out such a rescue operation.”
The comment offers insight into the difficult balancing act faced by security agencies, which must weigh the urgency of rescue missions against the risk of harm to hostages.
A Case for Decentralised Counter-Terrorism
Perhaps Buratai’s most concrete recommendation was his call for the expansion of the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), currently headquartered in Abuja.
The former army chief argued that Nigeria’s evolving security threats require a more decentralised approach, with state-level branches equipped with advanced technology and real-time intelligence capabilities.
“The Office of the National Security Adviser has the National Counter Terrorism Centre. It should be further expanded to have branches in various states with highly technical equipment, very good operation centres or situation rooms as the case may be,” he said.
For Buratai, such centres could improve coordination among security agencies, enhance intelligence sharing, and accelerate responses to emerging threats.
“They need to expand beyond their beautiful headquarters in Abuja,” he added.
The Road Ahead
As insecurity continues to spread beyond its traditional hotspots, Buratai’s remarks underscore a growing concern among security experts: Nigeria’s security challenge is no longer confined to a single region.
The attack in Oyo State serves as a reminder that criminal networks are adapting, relocating, and exploiting vulnerabilities across the country. Addressing the threat, Buratai suggests, will require more than military firepower. It will demand stronger intelligence systems, greater community participation, improved coordination among agencies, and a national strategy capable of anticipating rather than merely reacting to emerging threats.
For a country grappling with an increasingly fluid security landscape, the message is clear: what began in the North-East years ago is now everybody’s concern.
