Five years after COVID-19 exposed the vulnerabilities of the global health system, the world may still be dangerously unprepared for the next pandemic. That was the central message delivered by Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), during the closing session of the 79th World Health Assembly.
His warning was blunt: without agreement on the Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) annex, the global community cannot honestly claim readiness for future health emergencies.
The statement reflects a growing anxiety within international health circles that, despite the painful lessons of COVID-19, political divisions, funding uncertainty, vaccine nationalism, and weak global cooperation still threaten collective pandemic preparedness.
At the heart of the debate is the question of how countries share dangerous pathogens and, more importantly, how the benefits derived from them — including vaccines, treatments, diagnostics, and scientific data — are distributed fairly.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, many lower-income countries accused wealthier nations of monopolising vaccines and medical supplies despite relying heavily on global pathogen-sharing systems that involved contributions from poorer regions. African nations, in particular, criticised what they described as “health inequality,” arguing that while samples and data were shared internationally, access to life-saving vaccines remained deeply unequal.
The proposed PABS annex is designed to address those tensions by creating clearer rules on pathogen access, scientific cooperation, and equitable benefit-sharing during future outbreaks.
Tedros’ insistence on finalising the agreement suggests that global consensus remains fragile. While countries broadly support pandemic preparedness in principle, disagreements continue over intellectual property rights, pharmaceutical profits, technology transfers, national sovereignty, and vaccine equity.
These tensions reveal a deeper geopolitical reality: pandemics may be global, but responses often remain nationalistic.
The WHO Director-General’s remarks also come at a time when new outbreaks continue to emerge across different parts of the world. His references to Ebola and hantavirus underline the growing concern that infectious disease threats are becoming more frequent in an interconnected world shaped by climate change, urbanisation, environmental disruption, conflict, and increased global mobility.
Public health experts warn that future pandemics may spread even faster than COVID-19 if global coordination mechanisms remain weak.
Beyond the PABS debate, the 79th World Health Assembly highlighted the widening scope of global health concerns. Resolutions adopted during the week addressed issues ranging from tuberculosis and neglected tropical diseases to stroke, transplantation, emergency care, diagnostic imaging, and precision medicine.
This broad agenda reflects how modern public health challenges are increasingly interconnected. Countries are no longer dealing solely with infectious diseases but also rising burdens from non-communicable diseases, ageing populations, technological disparities, and strained healthcare systems.
Yet behind the ambitious resolutions lies a difficult financial reality.
WHO itself has struggled with funding uncertainty for years. Much of its budget depends on voluntary contributions from member states and donors, leaving the organisation vulnerable to political pressure and financial instability.
Tedros’ call for increased assessed contributions was therefore not merely administrative. It was a strategic appeal for institutional independence and sustainability.
His argument is simple: a global health agency cannot respond effectively to emergencies if it lacks predictable funding.
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed how quickly health crises can overwhelm even advanced healthcare systems. It also demonstrated the importance of strong international coordination during emergencies involving vaccines, border controls, medical supplies, disease surveillance, and scientific research.
However, the post-pandemic years have also revealed signs of global fatigue. Many governments facing economic pressures are prioritising domestic concerns over international health commitments. Political polarisation and geopolitical competition have further complicated consensus-building on global governance issues.
Against that backdrop, Tedros’ declaration that WHO is “not an organisation in crisis” appears aimed as much at reassuring member states as defending the institution’s credibility.
Criticism of WHO intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, with accusations ranging from delayed responses to political influence and institutional weakness. Some countries questioned the agency’s independence and effectiveness, while others argued that WHO lacked sufficient authority to enforce coordinated action among sovereign nations.
Yet the organisation remains the world’s primary platform for international health cooperation.
Its defenders argue that while WHO has limitations, global pandemic preparedness would be significantly weaker without a central coordinating body capable of facilitating information-sharing, technical guidance, and emergency response coordination.
The broader concern raised by the latest Assembly is that the world risks repeating old mistakes.
COVID-19 demonstrated how delayed cooperation, unequal access to vaccines, misinformation, weak health systems, and geopolitical rivalries can deepen global crises. Despite that experience, negotiations over pandemic reforms continue to face resistance and slow implementation.
Tedros’ warning therefore carries implications beyond diplomatic negotiations in Geneva. It reflects a larger question confronting the international community: has the world genuinely learned from COVID-19, or is it drifting back toward complacency while new health threats continue to emerge?
For now, the answer remains uncertain. But WHO’s message is increasingly clear — the next pandemic may not wait for political consensus.
